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This article addresses the question of the desirability of a tax on transactions in the securities
industry. Many of the other major industrialized economies impose such a tax. In Japan,
for instance, the tax raises $12 billion a year (see Roll, 1989). I propose to consider the
consequences of a tax at a relatively low rate, say .5 percent to 1 percent of the value of
the transactions.^
Underlying my analysis are two presumptions. First, as an economist, I begin with a
general suspicion against narrowly based taxes (as opposed to broadly based taxes, such as
income taxes). Such taxes frequently introduce unnecessary distortions,-^ and they are often
inequitable, since the incidence of the tax is borne by those particular individuals who
happen to like the commodity being taxed, or who happen to own shares in the industry
producing the commodity being taxed. There are four circumstances under which
governments frequently resort to selective taxes: (1) the commodity being taxed has a highly
inelastic demand, so that the tax has little distortionary effect; (2) the commodity being taxed
is a luxury good, consumed largely by the very rich, and not much weight is accordingly
attached to the reduction in its consumption (perfume falls into this category); (3) the
commodity being taxed is associated with certain benefits provided by the government (a
benefit tax)—gasoline and airport taxes fall within this category; and (4) the commodity
being taxed has some socially undesirable characteristics, such as giving rise to a negative
externality. Alcohol and cigarette taxes—in spite of their regressive nature—are justified
on the grounds of their inelastic demand and the negative social attributes of these
commodities. Where gambling is legalized, it is almost always heavily taxed. Corrective
(or Pigovian) taxes are designed to ameliorate some externality, where there is a deviation
between private and social costs and benefits.
The second premise is that well-functioning capital markets play a vital role in modern
capitalist economies. It is important that firms be able to raise capital and that risks be spread
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widely. I suspect that I do not need to preach the virtues of well-functioning capital markets
to this reading audience.
One might have thought that from these two premises I would be led naturally to the
conclusion that a tax on securities transactions is undesirable. The distortions introduced by
such a tax would seem to be far worse than those associated with the selective tax on
automobile tires, telephones, or the distortionary impact of the trade restrictions on textiles
and shoes. For such a tax interferes with the functioning of the capital markets—an
institution at the heart of American capitalism. Yet, I want to try to persuade you that such
a tax may actually be beneficial.
The heart of the argument is simple: the turnover tax is likely to discourage short-term
speculative trading. Keynes argued quite forcefully that such speculative trading was not
only not socially productive but actually interfered with the efficient functioning of the
economy. Firms were induced to pay excessive attention to short-term returns rather than
long-term concerns. The arguments we put forward are slightly different and are cast in the
language of modern welfare economics. But the conclusion is much the same.
The article is divided into three major sections. In the first, I argue that a tax on
transactions will not interfere with the major economic functions served by the stock
market—and may well enable the market to serve its essential functions more effectively.
This argument is predicated on the assumption that a turnover tax does not increase—and
may actually reduce—price volatility. Hence in the second section, I explain why a tax on
transactions is likely to reduce price volatility. In the third, I take up a few practical problems
associated with the implementation of such a tax.
In my description below, I shall focus my attention on stocks, but most of the arguments
apply with equal force to other capital markets.
1. The consequences of a turnover tax on economic efficiency
To understand the consequences of a turnover tax on trades on the stock market, we first
have to understand why individuals trade and what the economic functions are that the stock
market serves.
There are, of course, a variety of reasons for trade. Individuals buy shares during phases
of their life cycle when they are saving, and sell during phases of their life cycle when they
are dissaving. Changes in economic circumstances may lead individuals to wish to change
their portfolios, entailing selling some securities and buying others. But most of the
short-term trading in the stock market is motivated by quite different considerations:
individuals believe that they can beat the market, either because they are privy to insider
information, or at least information that is not widely available, or because they believe that
they are better able to interpret the world around them, and thus make predictions
concerning the performance of various securities, than are other investors. That is, most
trades are based on (the belief of) differential information.
A standard result in economics is that the market system provides incentives that ensure
economic efficiency. In this view, then, the fact that private returns seem so high on Wall
Street is indicative that there is an important social function being performed. A major thrust
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of theoretical research in economics during the past half-century has been understanding
the conditions under which there is a close congruence between social and private returns.
General results (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986) show that when informational problems,
such as those with which we are concerned here, arise, the market is not in general
(constrained Pareto^ )^ efficient. The reason for this may be seen intuitively as follows.'*As-
sume that as a result of some new information, there will be a large revaluation of some
security, say from $10 to $50. Assume that that information will be announced tomorrow
in the newspaper. What is the private versus social return to an individual obtaining the
information today? Assume the firm will take no action on the basis of the information—
certainly not as a result of knowing the information a day earlier. There is really no social
return to the information; production, in every state of nature, in every contingency, is
precisely what it would have been had the information not been available. But an individual
can buy the stock today, at $10, and make a $40 capital gain. He or she can obtain a four-fold
return on his or her investment. Of course, some one else would have obtained the return
had he or she not purchased it. The information has only affected who gets to get the return.
It does not affect the magnitude of the return. To use the textbook homily, it affects how
the pie is divided, but it does not affect the size of the pie.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1988) have shown that not only is the social return to this kind of
information gathering—getting information slightly earlier than other investors—less than
the private return, but this is even true of many of the financial innovations (like more rapid
recording of transactions) that have occurred in the past decade. More precisely, they show
that such financial innovations—to the extent that there are any costs associated with
them—actually lead the economy to a Pareto inferior equilibrium. Barring these innovations
(were this possible) could actually make everyone better off. The intuition behind this result
is simple. Imagine a pile of $100 bills lying on the floor, one near each individual. Assume,
given the natural lethargy of most individuals, that they all wait two periods to pick up the
$100 bill. Now consider what happens if one individual wakes up one morning and says
to himself, "All the other people are so slow to pick up their $ 100 bill. While they are getting
themselves organized, I can pick up the $100 bills next to their feet. The extra $100 bill(s)
will surely be worth the extra effort I have to put out." But, of course, if he does this, all
will respond. In the new equilibrium, all the people rush to pick up the $100 bill near their
feet as quickly as they can. In the end, they have exactly the same amount of money as they
did before; but now, they have had to exert energy to rush to pick it up. They are
unambiguously worse off.
The large deviation between social and private returns means that there are excessive
expenditures on gathering information and on financial innovation. Individuals invest to the
point where their marginal private return equals the return they could obtain elsewhere, and
since their private return is more than the social return, this means that the net marginal
social return is negative.
A turnover tax represents a tax on this kind of activity, and thus will serve to promote
economic efficiency by discouraging the excessive expenditures on this form of "rent
seeking." It can thus be viewed as a special and potentially important case of a Pigovian
corrective tax, a tax that improves economic efficiency at the same time that it raises
revenues.
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We now need to ask, are there other serious consequences of such a tax that would impair
the ability of the stock market to perform the vital roles that it plays in capitalist economies?
There are three functions commonly ascribed to the stock market, what I shall call (for
short) the exchange, the information, and the capital-raising functions. I shall now argue that
the most important of these functions may actually be enhanced by a turnover tax, and that
none of its important functions are likely to be impaired.
1.1. Exchange
The stock market allows individuals to trade with each other. Traditional texts in economics
begin with a discussion of the importance of exchange in economics, with the gains to trade.
Just as tariffs impede the exchange of goods among countries, turnover taxes impede the
exchange of assets among individuals. One of the three fundamental conditions required for
the (Pareto) efficiency of the economy is exchange efficiency (all individuals should have
the same marginal rate of substitution); the turnover tax interferes with exchange efficiency.
There are, however, two reasons not to be concerned much about this alleged inefficiency.
First, the proposed tax rates are sufficiently small that the deadweight loss from the tax (were
this a standard problem in economics) is indeed negligible: the deadweight loss is
proportional to the square of the tax rate, and hence a tax at the rate of .005 or .01 has a
very small deadweight loss.''
Second, there are real difficulties in interpreting the welfare losses associated with
impeding trades based on incorrect expectations. The standard analysis of exchange takes
individuals' preferences as given, and does not ask, for instance, why one individual likes
oranges and another likes apples. This is as it should be. But individuals do not demand
shares in GM or Ford because they have an intrinsic taste for GM shares or Ford shares.
Everyone likes dollars. Each wants more dollars. The demand for GM or Ford shares is
based on individuals' expectations concerning the returns that these shares will yield.
Exchanges are (largely) motivated by differences in judgments concerning what those yields
will be. Thus, to evaluate the consequences of the impediments to trade imposed by a
turnover tax, we have to take a closer look at who trades.
1.1.1. A ToAonomy of Traders. We can divide those who trade in these markets into several
different categories. A turnover tax will affect these groups differently.
At one extreme, there is a group of individuals who are basically uninformed. The most
sophisticated of these have been persuaded by the random walk (dartboard) theory of
securities markets, which holds that an individual can do as well throwing darts at a
dartboard as by turning his funds over to a specialist in portfolio allocation; and a fortiori,
he is not likely to do better than the market spending a few hours a week gathering
information from second-hand sources. These individuals buy indexed mutual funds. They
do not try to beat the market; they are content to know that they will do no worse than the
market.
At the other extreme are highly informed individuals. They could be insiders, for instance,
who know that their oil company has struck it rich and that that information has not yet
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leaked out. Or it could be the manager of a research division of a drug company who has
just seen a report verifying that the company's best-selling drug causes birth defects. We
call these the informed traders.
There is a third group of individuals, called noise traders, who may believe that they
understand how the stock market works, who may have theories about the connection
between sunspots and stock prices, or between some other observable and stock market
prices. These are the dentists and doctors in the Midwest and the retired individuals in the
Sunbelt, for whom ''following" their favorite stocks is a favorite pastime. We should
probably include many of the stock market brokers who advise them (and many of the
portfolio managers who manage unindexed funds) within this category.
In between are several groups of individuals who, for simplicity, I shall call partially
informed. They include those who study the noise traders'" and base their trading strategy
on "leaning against the wind." They try to take out of the market the noise that the noise
traders add. They also include those who try to figure out the "true market value"—the
fundamentals—and make purchases and sales when there are big deviations from their
calculated values. The trouble with this strategy is that even if an outsider could gather the
data on the basis of which he or she could make a reliable calculation of true market value,
he or she might have to wait a long time to realize a return; in the short run—which may
be years—the deviations between the market price and the 'true value" that he or she has
calculated may increase, not decrease, and the individual may be forced to sell out at a loss
before his or her greater wisdom has been recognized by the market.
It is hard to know whether the stock market was overvalued on October 1, 1987, or
undervalued on October 30; but there is a consensus that no event happened during the
month that wiped out a quarter of the fundamental value of American corporations.
Whatever position one takes, the overvaluation or undervaluation was a persistent one, one
that lasted not for minutes or hours, or even weeks, but months, and perhaps years.^ -^
1.1.2. How the turnover tax would affect different groups. Now we look at how a
transfer tax would affect these various groups. The first group—the uninformed—and the
truly informed are hardly likely to be affected by a tax at the moderate rates being
discussed—less than 1 percent. The uninformed buy securities in diversified portfolios,
holding onto them as a form of savings for extended periods of time. If bonds and stocks
are treated symmetrically, such a tax would have little effect on either total savings or its
allocation. By the same token, the kinds of events that form the basis of insider trading are
of sufficient moment that a 1 percent tax is not likely to discourage the trading. Similarly,
those who based their trading on fundamentals—who buy stocks when prices differ from
fundamentals and are willing to wait for the long term to realize their returns—are also
unlikely to have their behavior greatly affected. The 1 percent represents a small fraction
of the returns that they must expect before they undertake the risks associated with such an
investment strategy.
The turnover tax primarily affects short-term speculators, those who buy and sell within
the trading day, and within days or weeks. For these, such a tax may represent a significant
fraction of the returns they hope to achieve on each transaction. These short-term traders
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consist of two groups: noise traders and those who live off them.
Those who do not simply buy the market (or an index fund) are betting that they can do
better than the market, and that the extra return more than compensates them for the extra
risk and extra costs (for instance, in information gathering) that such a strategy entails. The
kind of trade that a turnover tax would discourage is based on the mistaken belief of (all!)
speculators that they could do better than average. Inevitably, some individuals will have
to be disappointed: half must have done worse than average.^ Impeding trade is (Pareto)
inefficient when viewed from the perspective of their ex ante expectations; impeding trade
may actually improve welfare when viewed from the perspective of their ex post
realizations. The result is similar to that of the father who forces his son to go to school
against his will and who later asks him, "Are you better off as a result?" From an ex ante
perspective, such coercion must be welfare-reducing. The child's ex ante expected utility
is lower than it otherwise would have been, say, if he had spent the day playing. Ex post,
the child agrees that he is better off.
As a society, there is a general consensus—reflected in a variety of laws and
regulations—that there may be gains, rather than losses, from taxing or prohibiting
gambling. Since the short-term speculative activity—the activities that will bear the brunt
of the tax—consist largely of noise traders and those trying to smooth out the market, to
make money from the noise traders, there may actually be a welfare gain from impeding
these exchanges; in any case, there is not likely to be a significant welfare loss.
One objection arises to this analysis: some might deny the existence, or at least
importance, of noise traders. The contention is that such traders would lose money and
therefore be weeded out by the market. But this conclusion is wrong. It forgets the famous
proposition, attributed, I think, to the great G. T. Barnum: a fool is bom every moment. For
every fool that is weeded out, a new one enters the market. In spite of the overwhelming
evidence of the difficulty of beating the market, small investors continue trying to do it.
The attempt itself is based on the basic proposition that there must be fools in the market.
For if any individual does better than the market, it must mean that someone else is, as we
have said, doing worse. An individual can guarantee himself the market by buying the
market. Thus, to try to beat the market, one must undertake a greater risk—a chance of doing
worse; and since rationality would dictate that on average the return will be average, there
is no return to compensate for this risk. It is only because each individual believes that he
or she is smarter than the other speculators—a proposition that cannot be "rationally" held
by all—that the market survives at all.^°
This kind of irrationality is pervasive. Three-fourths of my students believe that they are
in the top half of the class. More generally, we are not good statisticians. There is the famous
story of the firm that, in the days before modern medical technology made it possible to
predict the sex of a child, nonetheless claimed the ability to do so and promised a
money-back guarantee. It made a profit: it always predicted male, and had to return its
money only half the time. Individuals are always enticed by the stories of those who have
done better than the market—not recognizing that for every such story, there is a closet
speculator who has done worse. Individuals who do better than the market always claim it
was insight; those who do worse say it was bad luck.
Americans love to gamble, and the stock market—while it serves other important social
8
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functions—is our largest gambling casino. It is such a popular gambling casino precisely
because the winners can tell stories of their insights and theories—theories which, when
subjected to the test of scientific verification (can they be used in a predictive
manner?)—inevitably fail. Of course, gamblers in Las Vegas and Atlantic City tell stories
of their "feel for the dice," their intuition for how things were going to turn out; but
somehow, those stories connecting winning with the individual's own merits have a more
hollow ring than the claims put forward by the successful stock speculator.
1.2. Information
One of the alleged roles of the stock market is that the prices established on the stock market
are used to signal the expected returns to different kinds of investments. The stock market
provides a mechanism by which information is aggregated—the diverse information of the
many different individuals in society is all brought to bear in determining the market
value—and transferred, from the informed to the uninformed individuals (Grossman and
Stiglitz, 1976, 1980).
The stock market does this aggregation and transferring of information far more quickly
and effectively than could be done by alternative methods. Could one imagine the
deliberations of a committee assigned the task of determining the value of a stock on the
basis of the information each has available?'^
Tobin and others have developed theories in which these prices play a central role in the
allocation of investment. When stock prices are high, firms know to invest more. While
empirical work has provided, at best, weak support to this hypothesis, more recent work
(Greenwald and Stiglitz 1988a) has cast doubt about the interpretation of what empirical
support has been found and has argued that prices in the stock market play no basic
informational role in the economy.
The fundamental question can be put simply: does one really believe that the managers
of GM or Ford base their decisions about whether or how to invest on the prices that they
see on the stock market? Do they think that those prices—reflecting judgments of the
dentists in Peoria and the retired insurance salesmen in Florida—have much, if anything,
to add to the analysis of their own market research departments and the reports from their
engineers concerning costs of various projects? Any manager who argued that because the
price of his stock was high it was therefore a good idea to invest more would, I suspect,
quickly find himself looking for another job.
Moreover, the information revealed by the stock market price is not precise enough to
be of much use to most firms. It does the firm little good to know that there is some
investment project that the market thinks of value. Most investment does not consist of a
firm simply expanding its scale of production. The firm must make myriad decisions
concerning which of a multitude of possible projects to undertake. Each of these projects
has to be evaluated separately. The stock market price simply plays no major role in this
process of project evaluation.
In addition, much of the efforts of those gathering information are directed at obtaining
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information that cannot plausibly be of much relevance to firms in their investment
decisions, even if it were perfectly reflected in stock market prices. As Summers and
Summers (1989) put it.
It is hard to believe . . . that investments made with a horizon of hours reveal much
socially beneficial information to the market place (p. 16).
One circumstance does exist in which the stock market price will affect the level of
investment—when the firm actually decides to raise additional funds from the stock market.
But relatively, little investment is financed that way. In the next subsection, we shall argue
that a transfer tax may actually enhance the efficiency with which funds raised on the stock
market are allocated.
Thus, while it may be true that prices reflect information (even all information) of the
participants in the market, that fact in itself does not mean that that information plays an
important role in how investment decisions get made and resources get allocated.
Let me be quite clear about what I am arguing: I am not contending that the stock market
price is irrelevant. Firms worry about how their actions affect the stock market price.
(Managers who own stock market options may be particularly concerned about this.^-) But
managers do not glean information about what machines to buy or where to build a new
plant—the information they need for making intelligent investment decisions—from
looking at market prices.^^ The fact that stock market prices and investment decisions may
be correlated may simply reflect the fact that managers and the market are responding to
some of the same signals concerning the firm's prospects.
1.3. Raising capital
The third function that the security markets perform I have just alluded to: they help firms
raise new capital. There is an important link between this third function and the first, the
exchange function. Individuals are willing to buy shares in a firm because they are
marketable, because the individual can sell them, at relatively low cost, should it turn out
that he or she needs the cash for any purpose. Interfering with the exchange function thus
might interfere with the ability of the market to perform its capital-raising function.
Of the three functions, it is only this last function to which I attach some limited
importance. I do not think it would be greatly impeded by a small transfer tax; to some
extent, I think it would be enhanced, for reasons I will explain below.
In the next section, I will argue that a tax on turnover may reduce stock market volatility.
I see a distinct advantage arising from a reduction in volatility. For, to the extent that
volatility would be reduced, the buyer of the security bears less risk concerning the price
he or she will receive when he or she sells it. Thus, reducing the volatility will make it easier
for firms to raise equity capital.^^
Reducing volatility will also increase the efficiency with which capital is allocated. The
one time that firms find it attractive to issue new shares is when the market has overvalued
their shares. In that case, firms do more investment than is "socially" desirable, simply
because they are obtaining funds at a lower rate, because of the unreasonable expectations
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of noise traders. This is one of the reasons why high volatility is undesirable: it makes this
kind of misallocation of investment more likely.
If one thinks, as I do, that the most important function (from the social view) of the stock
market is raising new equity, one cannot but be struck by how, under current circumstances,
it seems to do so little of this at such great cost. As I noted earlier, only a small fraction
of investment is financed by new issues on the stock market. In spite of the huge
improvements in efficiency in the financial sector, the costs of running the financial sector
are huge. Summers and Summers note that these costs, which can be viewed as part of the
transactions costs of running the capitalist economy, amounted in 1987 to 16 percent of the
profits of the corporate sector; a more inclusive measure of the costs brings them up to a
quarter of corporate income and half of corporate net investment—and a multiple of the
value of new funds raised in the stock market. Of course, most of these resources are not
spent in raising new funds but in rearranging ownership claims on society's resources. They
are a part of the quest for rents. They affect who gets the returns to society's productive
assets, not which investments get made. Resources devoted to gambling—and to short-term
speculation in the stock market—could be devoted to more productive uses. (I include in
these relatively unproductive use of resources not only the transactions costs but also much
of the costs spent on acquiring information, including the extra costs of getting the
information slightly earlier than it would otherwise become available.) As an educator, I
must convey to you my sense of disappointment as some of my best students decide to
devote their lives to the quest for rents rather than to trying to increase society's productive
potential. Though I am not confident that a turnover tax of 1/2 or 1 percent is likely to have
a significant effect in this direction, it will help at the margin.
There is another argument sometimes put forth as to why a turnover tax may enhance
the efficiency of the economy. A turnover tax is largely a tax on short-term speculation.
As a percentage of long-run returns, a 1 percent turnover tax becomes negligible. If an
investor is contemplating making an investment for 20 years, with a 7 percent return per
year, a 1 percent turnover tax will reduce his or her return over the interim by only 1/2
percent. If the proportion of investors in the market that are long term is increased, then
presumably the attention of firms will be directed toward the long term. There has been a
concern that the focus on short-term returns has forced managers to focus on short-term
profits, possibly to the detriment of long-run profitability.^^ Thus, this reorientation of
managerial focus may provide another reason why a turnover tax may have some
beneficial effects.
While I have focused my attention in this section on the stock market, similar arguments
apply to bond markets, with perhaps even greater force. For the main determinant of future
bonds prices are future interest rates. The task of speculators is thus to forecast the policy
of the Federal Reserve Board. Here, I must confess a professional weakness: I simply do
not believe that the dentist in Peoria—or his stock broker—can do a better job of predicting
those policy changes than the major econometric models. I cannot but believe that whatever
he bases his guesses on, they can only be thought of as adding noise to the market. And
if it were desirable that information about future Federal Reserve policies be made public,
then wouldn't it make more sense for the Fed to announce that information, rather than
having others try to second-guess the Fed?
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2. Price determination and price volatility
Prices on the stock market—as in other competitive markets—are determined by the
intersection of demand and supply. But the demand and supply of assets, such as stocks,
differ from that for commodities like wheat because their principal determinant is
individuals' expectations about what those assets can be sold for at some date in the
future. They are based, in other words, on expectations, and these expectations can
obviously change dramatically in short periods of time. That is why prices on stock
markets can be so volatile.
Some critics of turnover taxes have expressed a concern that such taxes would result in
thinner markets, leading to greater volatility and less liquidity. In this section, I explain why
I am not persuaded by those objections, and indeed, it seems quite plausible that such a tax
may actually reduce price volatility.
The analysis of this section is divided into three parts. First, I explain why while a turnover
tax is likely to lead to thinner markets, it is not likely to lead to significantly larger spreads
between buying and selling prices. It may actually lead to smaller spreads. Second, I argue
that among those who find it no longer profitable to trade are a disproportionate number
of individuals who contribute to market volatility; as a result, the thinner markets, instead
of leading to increased price volatility, may well result in reduced volatility.
2.1. A turnover tax leads to thinner markets but not necessarily larger spreads
A tax on turnover is likely to discourage some individuals who otherwise have traded in
the market from doing so. It will discourage sellers as well as buyers. If its effects were
symmetric, it would simply make the market thinner.
Thinner markets have a bigger spread between buying and selling prices, and in that sense
are less liquid. The usual argument for this is simple: buyers and sellers do not in general
arrive in the market at the same time. With thinner markets, it may take a longer time for,
say, a seller to be matched up with a buyer. Market makers make the market by buying from
the seller, then holding the security in inventory until the buyer arrives. The market makers
need to be compensated for performing this function (both for the capital which is tied up
and the risks which are borne). Such a transfer tax thus has not only a direct effect in
increasing the spread between buying and selling price but an indirect effect as well. For
widely traded stocks, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, it is hard to believe that
this effect would be significant. The extra "carrying" time is probably minutes, perhaps even
seconds, and it is hard to see—if markets work reasonably well—how this effect could be
significant.
2.2. Wh\ a turnover tax may reduce volatility
In the previous section, we placed investors into four different categories, and argued that
a turnover tax would serve to discourage primarily noise traders and those who live off them.
12
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Since these traders add to the noise of the market, discouraging them will lead to less volatile
markets.
One objection to this argument is that, while it may discourage noise traders (who, as their
cumulative after tax losses will appear larger, will drop out of the market more rapidly, and
who, aware of the tax, will engage in trades only when they are confident of larger returns),
it also discourages those who live off the noise traders, the arbitrageurs who stabilize the
market in the short term. Isn't it possible that these individuals are discouraged even more
than the noise traders? And, in that case, couldn't the market be even more volatile? There
is such a possibility, but theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest that we
should not give too much weight to that possibility.
Assume, on the one hand, that these arbitrageurs were doing a good job, and that as a
result, in spite of the noise traders, prices were following their "true" values. Now, there
is a tax, which makes it unattractive for them to buy or sell the stock unless the price deviates
more than 1 percent from its true value. Then it is possible that there may be more
volatility—within this 1 percent window of true value—but relative to the magnitude of
volatility that we observe, this would seem to be truly a second order effect. It is also possible
that the market would be less volatile, since prices will not adjust to reflect small changes
in true values.
We can establish two general propositions. First, if an individual decides to switch from
one security into another, the transfer tax will not affect the timing of the switch.^^ Second,
the deviations from true market value cannot be greater on average than the magnitude of
the tax. Since the size of the proposed taxes is small, the maximum increase in volatility
is negligible. The argument establishing the upper bound on the increase in volatility makes
it clear that the normal expectation is that there will be a significant reduction in volatility,
as noise traders drop out of the market.^ "^
The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that such a tax would not likely increase
volatility and might well reduce it. The effect of transactions costs are similar to those of
a turnover tax. They represent a wedge between the buying and selling price. The past two
decades have seen marked changes in transactions costs. While many other changes have
also occurred, there is little evidence to suggest that markets are less volatile now than they
were two decades ago. Recent experience provides strong suggestions to the contrary.
Closing a market can be viewed as an extreme case of a prohibitive tax. Does closing
the market for a day lead to more or less variability in stock prices? If the market was
basically tracking changes in fundamentals, the difference between the opening price on
Thursday morning and the closing price on Tuesday night should be unaffected by the
closing the market on a Wednesday. If much of the volatility in the market is contributed
by noise traders, then closing the market on Wednesday will have reduced their
opportunities to add noise to the market (some of which, admittedly, will have been removed
by the arbitrageurs making money off them, but they will not have fully done their job).
In this view, then, the deviation of the market price on Thursday morning from the close
on Tuesday will be smaller if the market is closed on Wednesday. French and Roll (1987)
provide convincing evidence that during the period in 1968 when the market was closed
on Wednesday (because of the inability of the back rooms to keep up with the increasing
volume of trade), volatility was greatly reduced—by a factor of 1/2!^ ^
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Indeed, there are other theoretical arguments to suggest that short-term trading
contributes little to price stability. The objective in short-term trading is to obtain
information before others do. Information obtained more quickly is likely to be noisier.
Assume, for instance, that there is a weekly shift in a fundamental variable describing a
security. The value of this fundamental variable becomes publicly available at 2:00 pm on
Friday. Individuals speculate all week long about what that value is. As Friday approaches,
their information becomes better. The rush to get information about the value on Friday will
result in statistics on Monday that are quite noisy estimators of Friday's value; but, of course,
Monday's price will (in a well-functioning market) fully reflect that information.
If firms had to take actions on Tuesday morning and had to rely on the stock market value
for taking those actions, then there would be some value in having this "early" information,
as noisy as it is. But I argued in the previous section that early information is of little or
any productive value. Indeed, to the extent that it contributes to price volatility, it will have
negative effects on the economy, as I suggested above.
3. Implementing a turnover tax
A turnover tax has some distinct advantages relative to other capital taxes, particularly to
capital gains taxes. The capital gains tax distorts individuals' holding periods, while the
fundamental result established in section 2 is that, for those who still find it profitable to
trade, the turnover tax will lead them to trade at the same time that they otherwise would
have traded.
Moreover, the turnover tax has the property of (on average) automatically phasing itself
out for long-term investments; that is, as a proportion of returns, it becomes negligible as
the holding period increases. Thus, it will not have a significant affect on long-term
investors. Its major impact will be on short-term noise traders and those who live off them.
The turnover tax has two other advantages over a capital gains tax. First, it avoids the
arbitrage opportunities inherent in a capital gains tax that allows even limited loss
deductability (see Stiglitz, 1983). Second, since a tax with loss deductability subsidizes
losers while taxing winners, it effectively subsidizes noise traders (who, it will be recalled,
on average lose money), and it taxes arbitrageurs. This differential effect may accordingly
lead to increased price volatility.
There is one difficult problem in implementing such a tax, which is how to treat equitably
and efficiently different categories of assets. A turnover tax on the stock market would
simply encourage speculation to move to the options market. A turnover tax on the options
market, based on the value of the option, would have a similar effect. Buying a call option
and selling a put is equivalent to buying the share; thus, to avoid distortions, this combined
transaction must face the same tax. Accordingly, to avoid a distortion, the tax imposed on
the options market must be based on the striking price. (A tax at half the rate imposed on
the stock, imposed on each, the call option and the put, would be roughly neutral.) But the
tax would then be a large proportion of the value of the transaction. Since I am not sure
that much harm—and some good—could result from discouraging the kind of short-term
speculation that predominates in these markets, this does not bother me too much, but 1
suspect that it would generate considerable opposition.
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Let me mention briefly one other concern. The tax reduces the return on savings and,
critics charge, this will reduce savings. There is little evidence of a large elasticity of supply
of savings, and hence one would not have thought that a 1 percent tax would have a
significant effect on funds put away for 10 or 20 years. If, however, one decided that this
was a concern, one could easily allow for a phasing down of the tax rate for investments
held over several years.
4. Concluding remarks
No institution in our capitalist society is as venerable as the stock market. A turnover tax
might seem, at first glance, to be an attack on this foundation of our economy. I have tried
to argue that such a tax is likely to increase the overall efficiency of the economy and may
actually enhance the efficiency with which the stock market performs its most important
roles. The fact that at the same time it raises revenues—reducing the size of the national
deficit—is but one additional benefit of a tax which, on its own merits, seems desirable.
Notes
1. Other taxes, such as capital gains tax, would have quite similar effects. I argue below (section III) that a
turnover tax has some distinct advantages over a capital gains tax. For most of the analysis, I shall consider a flat
rate tax, with the rate of taxation not depending on the holding period. The consequences of alternative provisions
are discussed briefly in section III.
2. It used to be thought that because such taxes introduce additional distortions, they were therefore inefficient.
Since Ramsey's classic 1927 article, it has been recognized that such an argument is false: one cannot simply count
the number of distortions. Two little distortions could, in principle, be preferable to one large distortion. Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976) have shown, however, that in at least one central case, the general presumption against selective
commodity taxes remains valid. For a more general exposition, see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
3. An economy is Pareto efficient if no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off.
The term constrained Pareto efficiency is employed simply to remind us that in evaluating whether a government
policy would constitute a Pareto improvement, we need to take into account the constraints facing the private sector
in particular, the fact that information is imperfect and costly to obtain.
4. This version of the argument was set forth—considerably earlier than the general theorem—by Hirschleifer
(1971) and Stiglitz (1971).
5. One might argue that a turnover tax of even .5 percent represents a substantial fraction of the expected return
for a short-term investment. But this is an inappropriate way to view the distortion. The question is, how different
can the marginal rates of substitution between two assets between two individuals be without trade occurring? If
their relative valuations of two assets differed by more than 1 percent, it would pay them to trade.
6. These are the judges in Keynes' famous beauty contest, whose objective was not to decide who was the most
beautiful contestant but who the other judges were likely to think was the most beautiful.
7. There is, in theory, the possibility of a fifth group, those who turn to the stock market to hedge against certain
risks that they face. In the futures market, these hedgers are an important class of participants, but they do not appear
to be important in the stock market. Workers in the automobile industry do not sell short automobile stocks to hedge
against the risks of being unemployed; on the contrary, their pension funds tend to be disproportionately weighted
toward risks that are correlated with their employment risks. (In some cases, there may be good institutional
reason.s, such as preferential tax treatment, for these portfolio decisions.) In any case, however, the market provides
little information concerning the correlation of specific securities with particular categories of risk; the only
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correlation thai is conventionally provided is with the market as a whole. This suggests that few investors find
such information of value in making their portfolio decisions.
S. It is worth noting that even the return of the fully inlormed depends on the existence of the noise traders;
if all individuals were of the first type, and simply purchased the market, the truly informed would affect market
prices but would not be able to reap returns.
y. This would only be correct if the distribution of gains and losses were symmetric. More realistically, the stock
market is like a lottery: many individuals lose a little, and a few gain a lot. If this is true, then more than half of
the individuals are disappointed.
10. This proposition was originally asserted in Stiglitz (1971), and more formally stated and proved in Stiglitz
(l'^ KSZa). More formal proofs are provided by Milgrom and Stokey and by Tirole.
11. While we showed precisely how markets perform their role of aggregating and transferring information,
we also showed that as long as information was costly, capital markets would never be efficient, that is, not all
the information would be conveyed from the infonned to the uninformed. Gale and Stiglitz (1985) and Jordon also
show that it is only under highly special conditions that markets perfectly aggregate information, that is, that one
can infer from the market price, say, all the relevant information of the participants in the market.
12. Indeed, the fact that they are particularly concerned about the short-run movements in the stock market has
long been a criticism of managerial compensation schemes that relate pay to performance in the near term, rather
than in the more distant future.
13. Moreover, given the kinds of criteria conventionally employed in undertaking an investment project, a small
revision in market value would virtually never affect whether a project was undertaken. Given that, what value
can there be to having infonnation that would revise that value one minute earlier?
14. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987a, 1987b, 1988) have argued, in turn, that making it easier to raise equity will
have important benefits in ameliorating business cycles; they attribute much of the cyclical fluctuations to the
inability of firms to divest themselves of the risks they face.
15. Dramatic evidence of this is provided by firms that failed to take advantage of accelerated depreciation,
LIFO accounting, and other tax provisions that reduced reported income while reducing the present discounted
value of tax payments.
16. The argument is simple. Assume the expected instantaneous return on security / at time t is r, (r). and let
R, (V, T) = Tr,
Then the total return from holding security 1 from 0 to t, and security 2 from f to T is
(1 - Y)" expy?](0,0 exp /?2(^ ^ '
where y is the turnover tax rate. The value of t at which this is maximized is independent of y.
17. Consider a 1 percent tax. If, in an average period, the maximum deviation was more than 1 percent greater
than it had previously been, any arbitrageur who previously found it profitable to speculate would still find it
profitable to do so. Hence, the supply of arbitrage services would remain unchanged. Yet the need for arbitrage
services is reduced, since the return to noise traders after tax is lower (more negative.)
18. There is a vast recent literature providing empirical support to the argument that stock prices do not track
fundamental values well, and that there is the kind of noise in prices consistent with a theory that ascribes
importance to noise traders. See, for instance, Shiller (1981).
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